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SELF-REGULATION OF THE AMERICAN RETAIL 
SECURITIES MARKETS – 
AN OXYMORON FOR WHAT IS BEST FOR 
INVESTORS? 
Steven Irwin, Scott Lane, Carolyn Mendelson, and Tara 
Tighe∗ 
For self-regulation to be effective, government must play a residual 
role, keeping a shotgun “behind the door, loaded, well-oiled, cleaned and 
ready for use but with the hope that it would never have to be used.”1 
 
- William O. Douglas, SEC Chairman 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 In the fall of 1930, a mechanic from Houston wrote that in “[a] land 
flowing with milk and honey,”  
a “first-class mechanic can’t make an honest living.”  Having lost 
his savings in the recent stock market crash and unable to find 
work in the shadow of the Great Depression, he was too proud to 
beg for money and “too honest to steal.”  In the end, he decided 
to take matters into his own hands, writing that he would “rather 
take [his] chances with a just God than with an unjust 
humanity.”2  
 Eighty-one years later, the story is still much the same, and the need 
for investor protection for the American retail investing public is greater 
 
∗  Steven Irwin is a Commissioner of the Pennsylvania Securities Commission and a partner 
at Leech Tishman Fuscaldo & Lampl.  Scott Lane is the Deputy Chief Counsel for the 
Pennsylvania Securities Commission.  Carolyn Mendelson is Counsel for the Pennsylvania 
Securities Commission.  Tara Tighe is a 2012 J.D. candidate at the University of Pittsburgh 
School of Law. 
 1.  WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 82 (Allen ed., 1940). 
 2.  ANTHONY J. BADGER, THE NEW DEAL: THE DEPRESSION YEARS, 1933–1940 11 
(2002). 
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than ever.  On December 11, 2008, Richard Shapiro, a retired real estate 
developer, rose one morning expecting to quietly peruse the morning 
newspaper.  Instead, his worst fears were starkly splashed across the front 
page.  He felt the color drain from his face as he struggled to comprehend 
the dire headlines.  Bernard Madoff, a trusted financial adviser, had been 
arrested after confessing to cheating investors out of billions of dollars.3 
Mr. Shapiro reeled at the news.  Upon retirement, he had invested the 
entirety of his savings with Madoff.  In an instant, his financial security had 
vanished.  Shapiro sunk into a deep depression and did not leave his home 
for twenty-three days.  Too upset to eat, he lost thirty pounds.  To make 
ends meet, he was forced to sell his home and abandon retirement.  Despite 
these sacrifices, he still struggles to ensure his bills are paid.  Shapiro has 
stated that he felt “violated” because regulators had acted like “co-
conspirators” instead of protecting investors.4 
When the federal government first ventured into securities regulation 
in the 1930s, it was in direct response to a cataclysmic event: the stock 
market crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression.  Although 
speculation was rampant leading up to the crash, the types of investments at 
the time were mostly limited to stocks and bonds.  Eight decades later, the 
regulatory structure of the retail securities markets is relatively the same, 
yet the complexity of that market has grown exponentially.  Investors may 
now purchase variable annuities, exchange-traded funds, options, foreign 
currency, and a seemingly unlimited number of exotic securities created by 
investment banks.  Many of these complex investments, in particular credit 
default swaps and debt obligations collateralized by subprime mortgages, 
were instrumental in the global recession that began in 2008. 
At the same time, some very public failures in the enforcement of 
American securities laws (in particular, the Madoff and Allen Stanford 
investment scandals) further eroded investor confidence in the securities 
markets and in the ability of regulators to regulate those markets.  The 
Office of Inspector General’s Investigative Report concerning Madoff is 
particularly damning.  It found that the United States Securities & 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) had enough information to warrant an 
extensive investigation of Madoff as early as 1992.5  Despite these 
warnings and incriminating evidence provided to regulators, neither the 
 
 3.  Amir Efrati, Tom Lauricella, & Dionne Searcey, Top Broker Accused of $50 
Billion Fraud, WALL. ST. J., Dec. 15, 2008, at A14. 
 4.  Letter from Richard Shapiro, Madoff Victim, to the Honorable Denny Chin, U.S. 
District Court, Southern District of New York (Mar. 10, 2009). 
 5.  U.S. SEC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, REPORT NO. OIG-509, INVESTIGATION OF 
FAILURE OF THE SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF’S PONZI SCHEME (PUBLIC VERSION) 
(2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf.  
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SEC nor the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”)—the self-
regulatory organization (“SRO”) for broker-dealers and their agents—
responded to Madoff’s Ponzi scheme until after he confessed in 2008.6 
The recent economic crisis has garnered the attention of the United 
States Congress, the European Union, and regulators across the globe.  
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) in 2010, touted as the most sweeping 
change to financial regulation since the Great Depression.  Included in the 
Dodd-Frank Act is a requirement for the SEC to evaluate the adequacy of 
its oversight of investment advisers and to recommend whether Congress 
should designate one or more SROs to bolster the SEC’s supervision.7  
FINRA, which is already the SRO for broker-dealers, has signaled its 
desire to be the SRO for investment advisers as well.8  As of this writing, 
hearings have been held before the House Financial Services Committee on 
proposed legislation authorizing one or more SROs for investment 
advisers.9 
Missing from the debate in the United States, however, is whether the 
SRO model of securities regulation is an appropriate part of the American 
regulatory framework in the first place, and if so, whether any changes 
need to be made in order to make the regulatory framework more efficient 
and effective.  This Article explores the complicated history of self-
regulation in the U.S. retail securities markets, and analyzes the current 
challenges in cooperation among the SEC, FINRA, and state securities 
regulators.  Finally, a variety of normative solutions are offered to highlight 
opportunities to improve efficiency, reduce potential conflicts of interest, 
enhance communication, and limit costs. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CURRENT REGULATORY STRUCTURE 
The allure of profits inevitably engenders speculation and aggressive 
 
 6.  Id. at 1.  As a result of the SEC investigation, however, the SEC disciplined eight 
employees for missteps related to the Madoff investigation. See Jesse Hamilton, SEC 
Suspended Employees, Cut Pay Over Madoff Missteps, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 14, 2011, 
available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-11/sec-suspended-employees-
reduced-pay-over-missteps-related-to-madoff-case.html. 
 7.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 914, 15 U.S.C. § 
80b-11 (2012).  
 8.  Richard G. Ketchum, Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, Fin. Indus. Regulatory 
Auth., Speech at Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association Compliance and 
Legal Division’s Annual Seminar (Mar. 22, 2011), available at 
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/Speeches/Ketchum/P123371.  
 9.  Hearing witnesses and written submissions can be found at the Committee on 
Financial Services’ website at http://financialservices.house.gov/Calendar/EventSingle. 
aspx?EventID=258252.  
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trading practices.  The 1929 stock market crash and the ensuing Depression 
are generally credited with inspiring federal securities regulation.10  The 
long history of retail securities regulation in the United States, however, is 
far more nuanced. 
A. Brokers “Exchange” Independence For Structure And Credibility 
Wall Street experienced its first major crash in 1792.11  In the wake of 
that crash, Pennsylvania and New York passed legislation intended to 
regulate the sales of securities.12  New York aggressively disallowed open-
air “public outcry” markets.13  In response, brokers took control of their 
own destinies and began to associate together, planting the seeds of 
exchange-based trading and self-regulation in America.14 
In May of 1792, twenty-four brokers congregated at 68 Wall Street.15  
They “pledged to deal primarily among themselves and to honor minimum 
commission rates.”16  Members of that group of brokers officially formed 
the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE” or “the Exchange”) on March 8, 
1817.17 
 
 10.  A Brief History of Securities Regulation, STATE OF WIS. DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS., 
http://www.wdfi.org/fi/securities/regexemp/history.htm (last visited June 2, 2012).  
 11.  The Institution of Experience: Self-Regulatory Organizations in the Securities 
Industry, 1792–2010, SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N HISTORICAL SOC’Y, http://www.sechistorical. 
org/museum/galleries/sro/sro02a.php (last visited June 2, 2012).  
 12.  Id.   
 13.  Id.  
 14.  Id.   
 15.  Id.  Early American self-regulated exchanges followed the British tradition of 
private trading clubs of the times.  See id.  More recently, the United Kingdom’s regulatory 
system for financial services had its roots in self-regulation within the Financial Services 
Authority (“FSA”), as created in October 1997.  PEIJIE WANG, FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 308 
(2d ed. 2009).  For over a decade, the FSA served as a single independent organization that 
was responsible for overseeing the banking, brokerage, and insurance industries.  However, 
recent weakness in global financial services has brought about the downfall of the FSA and 
self regulation.  The FSA is set to be disbanded by 2012 in favor of government-controlled 
regulators.  Shannon Hawthorne, UK Chancellor announces abolition of FSA, HFMWEEK 
(June 17, 2010), http://www.hfmweek.com/news/572177/uk-chancellor-announces-
abolition-of-fsa.thtml.   
 16.  Buttonwood Agreement, SEC HISTORICAL SOC’Y, 
http://sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1790/1792_0517_NYSEButtonwood.pdf.   
 17.  The Institution of Experience: Self-Regulatory Organizations in the Securities 
Industry, SEC HISTORICAL SOC’Y, http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/sro/ 
sro02a.php (last visited June 2, 2012) [hereinafter SEC HISTORICAL SOCIETY].  Juxtapose the 
time period for the creation of the NYSE with the more recent development of a non-state 
controlled securities market in China.  The Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange were each founded in 1990.  Brief Introduction to the SEE, SSE.COM.CN, 
http://www.sse.com.cn/sseportal/en_us/ps/about/bi.shtml (last visited June 2, 2012); SZSE 
Major Event and Milestones from 1990–2011 (Condensed Version), SZSE.CN, 
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The NYSE was premised on seventeen rules that governed trading and 
provided for admission and discipline of members.18  The NYSE 
envisioned a trading platform in which strenuous admission standards 
would make sanctions and discipline unnecessary.  The Exchange was 
largely governed by the personal ethical standards of its members.  In 
Belton v. Hatch, the Court of Appeals of New York characterized the 
NYSE as a “business club.”19  This permitted the Exchange to “regulate its 
members as it saw fit” and provides an early example of a self-regulator 
assuming control of the discipline of industry participants.20 
B. State Securities Regulation 
As individual investors’ access to the securities markets increased, 
states developed laws specifically regulating the offer and sale of securities 
to protect investors from fraud.  State regulation originated as an exercise 
of state police power under the Tenth Amendment, with Kansas setting the 
standard by passing the first blue sky law in 1911.21  The United States 
Supreme Court confirmed the constitutionality of state securities laws in 
Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co.22  In Hall, multiple provisions of various blue sky 
laws were evaluated for their constitutionality.  The blue sky law in Ohio 
provided that all dealers must be licensed before they were permitted to 
conduct business within the State.  In holding the law Constitutional, the 
Hall Court found that the law was merely a regulation of business with the 
goal of protecting the public against the imposition of unsubstantial 
 
http://www.szse.cn/main/en/AboutSZSE/Milestone/ (last visited June 2, 2012).  China has 
adopted recent national regulation to cultivate worldwide investor confidence, gain access to 
the World Trade Organization, fund state owned entities (SOEs) with private investment 
dollars, and develop the country into a “social market economy.”  Upon the creation of the 
two major Chinese stock exchanges, the State Council of China established the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission which is similar to the SEC.  The China Securities 
Regulatory Commission: Dedicated to Protecting Investors’ Rights and Interests, CHINA 
SECURITIES REGULATORY COMMISSION, http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/about/ (last 
visited June 2, 2012).  
 18.  NYSE Constitution of 1817, SEC HISTORICAL SOC’Y, 
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1810/1817_0225_NYSEConstitutionT.pdf.  
 19.  17 N.E. 225, 226 (N.Y. 1888).  
 20.  SEC HISTORICAL SOCIETY, supra note 17. 
 21.  Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. 
REV. 347 (1991).  The State of Kansas at the time had a large proportion of agriculturalists 
not versed in ordinary business methods.  By 1911, the state had become a hunting ground 
for promoters of fraudulent enterprises.  Laws aimed to stop schemes which have no more 
bases than so many feet of blue sky became known as “blue sky” laws.  Hall v. Geiger-
Jones, 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917). 
 22.  Hall, 242 U.S. at 559.  
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schemes and the securities based upon them.23 
To establish a uniform system of state securities regulation, the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws prepared 
the Uniform Sale of Securities Act (“the Uniform Act”) in October 1929.  
The majority of states have adopted blue sky regulations modeled after the 
Uniform Act.24 
By 1931, every state had adopted some form of securities laws.  
Unlike the disclosure-based system of the later federal securities laws, all 
of the early state securities laws were “merit” review laws, providing the 
state regulator the authority to deny applications which were not fair, just, 
or equitable to investors or which were not based on sound business 
principles.25  To increase efficiency, among other purposes, state regulators 
have worked cooperatively since 1919 through the North American 
Securities Administrators Association (“NASAA”). 
C. The Calm Before The Storm 
After World War I, the retail investment industry experienced a period 
of sustained high growth as individual investors discovered the stock 
market in increasing numbers.26  Stock prices soared, but the average 
investor was unaware that to a large extent those profits were a mirage, 
built on false promises.  During this time, there were numerous examples 
of market manipulation and a failure of self-regulation.  Stock pools were 
used to buy stock, boost the price, and then unload it at a profit.27  Brokers 
would create a “swirl of phony trading” that would cause stock prices to 
skyrocket.28  One example of such manipulation is the Libby Owens 
Security Trading Pool, managed by Joseph P. Kennedy.29  False 
information, implying that Libby-Owens-Ford was on the rise, was leaked 
 
 23.  Id. at 550.  
 24.  The Uniform Act is a model law intended to provide each state with a guide to 
draft its securities law.  Subsequent versions of the Uniform Act have been passed in 1956, 
1985, and 2002. 
 25.  See generally JOSEPH LONG, BLUE SKY LAW § 1:42 (discussing 
the “merit regulation” aspects of early state securities laws). 
 26.  Andrew Beattie, The Pioneers of Financial Fraud, INVESTOPEDIA (Jul. 15, 2009), 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/financial-theory/09/history-of 
fraud.asp#axzz1SyTOs2Wa.   
 27.  Stock Exchange Practices: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking and 
Currency, 72nd Cong., pt. 6 at 2204 (1933).   
 28.  Randall Smith & Linda Sandler, Raiders’ Activities Revive Memories of 1920s 
Pools, WALL STREET J., Nov. 10, 1986.   
 29.  TED SCHWARZ, JOSEPH P. KENNEDY: THE MOGUL, THE MOB, THE STATESMAN, AND 
THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN MYTH 177 (2003). 
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to “everyone who could influence the stock.”30  Kennedy is estimated to 
have made more than $60,000 on the stock run-up in four months.31  Before 
the ensuing crash, Kennedy liquidated his long-term holdings and 
continued to make money on the declining market by selling short.32 
The situation was exacerbated by the limited reach of state regulators, 
whose jurisdiction was limited to protecting their own respective citizens.33  
Generally, state regulators had little if any authority over national or even 
regional exchanges. 
D. The Crash 
On Tuesday, October 29, 1929, Americans witnessed the “most 
disastrous day in the stock market’s history.”34  Prices collapsed under 
panic selling and the “pressure of liquidation of securities which had to be 
sold at any price.”35  In a single day, 16,410,030 shares were traded on the 
New York Stock Exchange.36  By mid-November, the market had lost 
twenty-six billion dollars, or forty percent of its value.37  The 
unemployment rate ballooned to nearly twenty-five percent.  The existing 
securities regulatory structure had failed.  The financial system needed 
drastic change, and in the 1932 election, the nation placed their faith in 
Franklin D. Roosevelt.  The public blamed the industry for the national 
panic and what would be a long-term American economic depression.38 
E.  The Depression Inspires Federal Regulation 
When Franklin Delano Roosevelt won the presidency in 1933, the 
 
 30.  Id.  
 31.  Id.  Contrast the 1920s in the United States to the 1990s and 2000s in China when 
China faced extensive criticism for ineffective enforcement to catch insider trading.  See 
Karby Leggett, China Will Merge Its Two Stock Markets—Combined Bourse Will be in 
Shanghai; Start-Ups Will Trade in Shenzhen, at A23, Wall Street J., Sept. 12, 2000.  
 32.  SCHWARZ, supra note 29, at 177.  
 33.  Pennsylvania Securities Act of 1972 § 702, 70 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1-702 (2011).   
 34.  Closing Rally Vigorous, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1929.  
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id.  
 37.  DAVID F. BURG, THE GREAT DEPRESSION 47 (Facts on File, Inc. 1996) (2005).  
 38.  The massive social chaos, poverty and strife of the Great Depression are echoed 
today in the current global recession.  An overall lack of government regulation of the 
largest and most powerful forces in today’s financial markets has been well documented as 
one of the key culprits in today’s “Great Recession.”  See Bruce Bartlett, The Great 
Depression and The Great Recession, FORBES.COM, http://www.forbes.com/2009/10/29/ 
depression-recession-gdp-imf-milton-friedman-opinions-columnists-bruce-bartlett.html (last 
visited June 2, 2012) (comparing the circumstances leading up to the Great Depression the 
circumstances of the current economic crisis).   
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U.S. financial services industry was a sinking ship, taking on more water 
by the minute.  The capsizing markets were a direct result of plummeting 
investor confidence, a crucial ingredient in stable retail securities markets. 
In his inaugural address, Roosevelt called for swift and unilateral 
action.  He openly condemned the practices of “unscrupulous money 
changers.”39  He declared that the “rulers of the Exchange of mankind’s 
goods have failed through their own stubbornness and their own 
incompetence.”40 
With the scars of the 1929 crash still fresh, Roosevelt challenged 
Congress to create a system of strict supervision of all banking, credits and 
investments.41  The implication was clear; Roosevelt recognized the 
shortcomings of the current regulatory system, including the failure of self-
regulation, and the need for the federal government to manage the U.S. 
securities markets. 
Congress responded quickly to Roosevelt’s warnings and the national 
emergencies that ensued in the wake of failed self-regulation, and passed 
the Securities Act of 1933 (“the 1933 Act”) in May of 1933.  The 1933 Act 
regulates disclosure requirements in new issuances42 to prevent fraud in the 
initial offer and sale of securities.43 
Regulating just the initial sale of securities was insufficient, however.  
The secondary markets could not be left to national self-regulation.  In a 
February 1934 statement to Congress, Roosevelt called for national 
regulation of the exchanges in order to eliminate widespread market 
manipulation and abuse.  He admonished that “naked speculation has been 
made far too alluring and far too easy.”44 
At the President’s request, Congress met to consider additional 
legislation and Congressional committees heard testimony from various 
industry professionals.  These committees heard testimony on how the 
industry had grown so quickly.  For example, in 1910 there were 500 
branches of stock exchange houses and by 1929 there were 1,600.45  
Speculation grew as stock prices continued to climb.  The Dow Jones 
 
 39.  President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933), available at 
http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres49.html. 
 40.  Id.  
 41.  Id. 
 42.  MARC STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 115 (5th ed. 2009).   
 43.  Id. 
 44.  President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address to Congress (Feb. 6, 1934), available at 
http://c0403731.cdn.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/collection/papers/1930/1934_02_06_FD
R_on_Stock_Exch.pdf. 
 45.  Stock Exchange Practices: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Banking and 
Currency, 73d Cong., pt. 15 at 6437 (1934).  
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Industrial Average rose from 73 in 1921 to 313 in 1929.46  Brokers’ loans 
increased from $1.5 billion in 1922 to $8.5 billion in 1929.  More than ten 
billion dollars of new stock was issued in 1929 alone.  In the crash of 
October 1929, brokers’ loans collapsed by three billion dollars in ten days, 
and by eight billion dollars in the following three years.  The Dow Jones 
Industrial Average declined by an astounding eighty-nine percent between 
September 1929 and July 1932.47 
Based on these considerations, Congress passed the Securities and 
Exchange Act in 1934 (“the 1934 Act”).  The 1934 Act regulated the sale 
of securities in the secondary market and created the SEC.48  Joseph 
Kennedy, with his reputation for unscrupulous market manipulation, was 
placed at the helm of the fledgling organization.49  Roosevelt is said to have 
responded to criticism of the appointment by saying “it takes a thief to 
catch a thief.”50  So, who better than Kennedy to lead the new experiment 
in federal securities regulation? 
The 1934 Act recognized that the trading of securities has national 
implications; hence, it is necessary to provide for government regulation 
and control of such transactions to protect the general welfare of the 
country.51  Specifically, one portion of the 1934 Act sought to increase 
margin requirements to make it more difficult for brokers and dealers to 
borrow to trade.52  Before the 1934 Act, the exchanges made their own 
rules regarding buying on margin.  Margins as high as ninety percent of 
trade amounts were not uncommon.  Section 7 of the 1934 Act made it 
clear that Congress was to “prescribe rules and regulations with respect to 
the amount of credit that may be initially extended and subsequently 
maintained on any security (other than an exempted security or a security 
futures product).”53 
 
 46.  Dow Jones Average Yearly Change, AUTOMATIONINFORMATION.COM, 
http://www.automationinformation.com/DJIA/dow_jones_average_year 
ly_change.htm (last visited June 2, 2012). 
 47.  DJI Historical Prices | Down Jones Industrial Average Stock, YAHOO! FINANCE, 
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EDJI&a=08&b=1&c=1929&d=07&e=1&f=1932&g=
m (last visited June 2, 2012). 
 48.  Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 4(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1 (2006).  
 49.  Timeline, SECHISTORICAL.ORG, http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/timeline/ 
(last visited June 2, 2011).  
 50.  Mike Brewster, Joseph Kennedy’s Enduring Example, BLOOMBERG  
BUSINESSWEEK, May 29, 2003, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/may2003/ 
nf20030529_7026.htm. 
 51.  § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006).  
 52.  Stock Exchange Practices: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Banking and 
Currency, 73d Cong., pg. 15 (1934).  
 53.  § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (2006). 
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F. Over-the-Counter Regulation 
In 1934, NYSE President Richard Whitney presciently warned that the 
1934 Act was “rigid and inflexible” in its regulation of the U.S. 
exchanges.54  He predicted that the 1934 Act would deflate securities prices 
and hinder economic recovery.55  The 1934 Act’s regulation of the 
exchanges was comprehensive, and included requirements for minimum 
capitalization, outstanding shares, and minimum stock prices.56  To escape 
the regulatory spotlight, many securities issuances simply avoided the 
listing standards of the exchanges and traded over-the-counter (“OTC”) 
instead.57  The OTC markets were left largely unregulated by the 1934 Act.  
OTC issuances did not have the disclosure requirements placed on 
exchange-traded securities.58  By 1938, it was obvious that OTC trading, 
which encompasses “all transactions in securities which take place 
otherwise than upon a national securities exchange,” blossomed in the 
absence of regulation.59 
In congressional testimony in 1938, SEC Commissioner and former 
Wisconsin securities regulator George C. Mathews highlighted the dangers 
of unsupervised OTC trading.  He vividly described the OTC markets as 
“unorganized” and unregulated.60  OTC trading was “immense and 
varied.”61  In 1938, 6,766 brokerage firms were registered with the SEC as 
transacting business in the OTC markets.62  In comparison, there were only 
1,375 members of the New York Stock Exchange.63  At the time of 
Mathews’ testimony, 6,000 separate issues of stocks and bonds were 
admitted to trading on all U.S. stock exchanges.64  In stark contrast, there 
were 60,000 total stock issues trading on the OTC markets.65  Indeed, 
Mathews estimated that the OTC markets provided the “principal channel 
 
 54.  Letter from Richard Whitney, President, New York Stock Exchange, to Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, U.S. President, (Apr. 12, 1934) available at http://c0403731.cdn.cloudfiles. 
rackspacecloud.com/collection/papers/1930/1934_04_12_Whitney_to_FDR.pdf.  
 55.  Id. 
 56.  §§ 12, 13, 15, 15 U.S.C. § 78l (2012).  
 57.  Regulation of Over-the-Counter Markets: Hearings before the S. Comm. on 
Banking and Currency, on S. 3255, 75th Cong., at 14 (1938).  
 58.  Id.  
 59.  Id. at 12 (statement of George C. Mathews, Commissioner, Securities and 
Exchange Commission).  
 60.  Id. at 7.  
 61.  Id. at 12.  
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id.  
 64.  Id.  
 65.  Id. 
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for the flow of the savings of our people into new financing.”66  Further, 
Mathews opined that direct governmental control of OTC trading was 
impractical and prohibitively expensive.  He believed that governmental 
control would be complex, like “trying to build a structure out of dry 
sand.”67 
In light of these observations, Congress passed the Maloney Act in 
1938.68  With this amendment to the 1934 Act, Congress sought to 
“encourage over-the-counter dealers to organize and regulate their 
activities under governmental supervision.”69  The premise behind the 
amendment was that “[a] group which participates in the promulgation of a 
rule . . . will obey that rule better than if it did not share in its enactment.”70  
Congress wanted to create a variety of organizations in which brokers and 
dealers could register to promote voluntary compliance with ethical 
standards.  Indeed, under the Maloney Act, “more than one association of 
broker dealers could apply for recognition, yet only one did—the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”).71 
G. Ushering in the Modern Era 
In 1975, the 1933 and 1934 Acts were amended to give the SEC the 
power to initiate and approve SRO rule making.  The amendment expanded 
the SEC’s role in SRO enforcement, oversight, and discipline, which 
allowed the SEC to play an active role in structuring the public securities 
markets.72 
Initially, the exchanges were non-profit organizations.  In 2005, by 
virtue of its merger with Archipelago Holdings Inc., an electronic 
communications network,73 the NYSE became a public company.74  As a 
result, the public could own shares in the stock exchange, and the exchange 
was answerable to its shareholders.75  As a public company, the NYSE was 
 
 66.  Id. at 13.  
 67.  Id. at 8.  
 68.  Over-the-Counter Market Act, Pub. L. No. 75-719, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938) (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3). 
 69.  Tamar Hed-Hofmann, The Maloney Act Experiment, 6 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 
187 (1965).  
 70.  Id. at 210.  
 71.  Id. at 187. 
 72.  Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).  
 73.  Yesenia Cervantes, Note, “Fin Rah!” . . . A Welcome Change: Why the Merger 
Was Necessary to Preserve U.S. Market Integrity, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP & FIN. L. 829, 836 
(2008). 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id.  The NYSE merged with Euronext in 2007, which runs exchanges in Paris, 
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focused on making a profit, which begs the modern question:  can the 
exchanges effectively self-regulate if their ultimate goal is to generate their 
own profit? 
In 2007, the NASD merged with the regulatory arm of the NYSE to 
create FINRA.  The two organizations announced that they wanted to form 
a “private sector regulator for all securities brokers and dealers doing 
business with the public in the United States.”76  Advocates asserted that 
the merger would ultimately decrease compliance costs, a savings which 
could be passed along to customers.77  Critics alleged that the merger would 
make enforcement a lower priority.78 
Today, FINRA oversees nearly 4,900 brokerage firms, 167,000 branch 
offices, and approximately 660,000 registered securities representatives.79  
FINRA has approximately 3,000 employees, with headquarters in 
Washington, D.C. and New York, and twenty regional offices.80 
The American regulatory system has placed significant faith in the 
concept of self-regulation in recent decades.  However, the current system 
has come under criticism for failing to prevent many of the major securities 
scandals since the 1980s.81  Most recently, the Bernard Madoff scheme 
went undetected for more than a decade.  Will self-regulation be effective 
in the American retail securities markets in the future, particularly in 
enforcement activities? 
 
 
Amsterdam, Brussels and Portugal making the NYSE.  Cervantes, supra note 73, at 843.  
 76.  Press Release, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, NASD and NYSE Group 
Announce Plan to Consolidate Regulation of Securities Firms (Nov. 28, 2006), available at 
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2006/P017973.  
 77.  Carrie Johnson, SEC Approves One Watchdog For Brokers Big and Small, WASH. 
POST, July 27, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/27/ 
AR2007072700108.html 
 78.  Id.  
 79.  FINRA Statistics, FINRA.ORG, http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/Statistics/index. 
htm (last viewed Aug. 28, 2011). 
 80.  Id.  Since 2008, Britain and the rest of Europe have been moving towards more 
governmentally controlled regulators, because the modern weaknesses of the financial 
services industry have been exposed and the global recession has occurred.  See Michel 
Banier, European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, The Date of 1st January 
Marks a Turning Point for the European Financial Sector, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Jan. 1, 
2011), http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/barnier/headlines/speeches/2011/01/ 
20110101_en.htm (announcing the development of three European Supervisory 
Authorities—in banking, markets, and insurance and pensions—that will cooperate with the 
European Systemic Risk Board).   
 81.  Letter from Danielle Brian, Executive Director, Project on Government Oversight, 
to Congress (Feb. 23, 2010), available at http://www.pogo.org/pogo-files/letters/financial-
oversight/er-fra-20100223-2.html. 
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II. CURRENT CONCERNS AND CHALLENGES IN AMERICAN SECURITIES 
REGULATION 
A. The Underlying Problem with Self-Regulation 
Self-regulation has always presented the proverbial problem of the 
“fox guarding the henhouse.”  In the bright light of day, the fox dutifully 
guards his post.  His watchful eyes are ready; his ears piqued to hear even 
the slightest whisper of a sound.  Inevitably, the sun fades and the shadowy 
hand of night sweeps across the horizon.  The fox abandons his post and 
slips surreptitiously inside the henhouse.  He has no apprehension, no 
reason to look over his shoulder.  He answers to no one.  He makes his own 
rules.  He is his own regulator, motivator, and enforcer.  Such is the 
dilemma faced by any group governed by the pure principle of self-
regulation. 
B. Structural Issues with SROs 
In addition to inherent theoretical problems with self-regulation, the 
structural framework of the SRO model itself raises questions of whether it 
can lead to effective regulation.  As the Boston Consulting Group pointed 
out in its study mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act, “[t]he most fundamental 
critique is that self-regulation is not real regulation at all:  at best, self-
regulation is less effective than government regulation, and at worst, is 
merely ‘an illusion’ meant to deflect calls for government oversight.”82 
The following section addresses the shortcomings of the current SRO 
structure as it applies to the overall regulatory landscape.  While we 
highlight FINRA for specific examples, in most instances these 
shortcomings apply to all SROs. 
1. The State Actor Issue 
One controversial issue concerning American SROs and their role in 
the regulatory community is the “state actor” or “governmental actor” 
question.  Essentially, is the SRO acting as the government, or is it acting 
as a private “membership” entity?  The U.S. Constitution protects a wide 
variety of individual freedoms.  These protections, however, only apply to 
governmental conduct.  Whether an SRO is deemed to be a state or 
governmental actor has significant implications for its ability to investigate 
 
 82.  BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: 
ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY AND REFORM 25 (2011) [hereinafter BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP], 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/967study.pdf. 
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and discipline its members, as well as for its ability to share information 
with other regulators and law enforcement officials.  For example, in recent 
years FINRA has been reluctant to share investigative material in ongoing 
investigations with state regulators, claiming that such sharing could make 
FINRA a “government actor.”83 
The state actor issue is best highlighted in the context of FINRA Rule 
8210, which requires members and persons associated with members to 
provide information and testimony with respect to an investigation, 
complaint, or proceeding authorized by FINRA.84  FINRA may sanction 
members for failure to provide information and testimony requested under 
Rule 8210.85  The Rule provides a means for FINRA to carry out its 
regulatory functions in the absence of subpoena power and is a “key 
element in [FINRA’s] effort to police its members.”86 
Rule 8210(b) further provides that FINRA may share investigative 
material with other federal agencies and regulators.87  What happens, then, 
when a FINRA member, who is or may be the subject of a criminal 
proceeding, is requested to give testimony or provide documents under 
Rule 8210?  Can the FINRA member invoke the Fifth Amendment 
privilege, which provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself?”88  If FINRA is not a “state 
actor,” the Fifth Amendment privilege is unavailable and the FINRA 
member risks sanctions, including suspension or revocation of his 
registration, for refusing to cooperate. 
In general, the Fifth Amendment privilege does not apply to 
questioning in proceedings before SROs such as FINRA, because the 
regulatory activities of such entities do not rise to the level of “state 
action.”89  Conduct by FINRA and other SROs may be treated as “state 
action” if it is found to be “fairly attributable” to the government.90  When 
considering cases under the state actor doctrine, courts generally require 
one of three circumstances:  (1) the exercise of coercive power or 
significant encouragement by the government of the activity in question; 
 
 83.  Finra Oversight Could Cost Investors, FA-MAG.COM (June 28, 2011), 
http://www.fa-mag.com/fa-news/7790-finra-oversight-could-cost-investors.html. 
 84.  FINRA R. 8210 (FINRA 2010), available at  
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=13244&element_
id=3883&highlight=8210#13244.   
 85.  Id.  
 86.  Application of Richard J. Rouse, Exchange Act Release No. 32658, 1993 WL 
276149 (July 19, 1993). 
 87.  FINRA R. 8210 (FINRA 2008), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/ 
display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=13244&element_id=3883&highlight=8210#13244. 
 88.  U.S. CONST. amend. V.   
 89.  United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863, 867 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 90.  Id.  
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(2) performance of a traditional governmental function by a private entity; 
or (3) a “symbiotic” interdependence between the government and the 
private entity.91 
Courts addressing the specific issue of the Fifth Amendment privilege, 
however, have consistently found that the mere sharing of investigative 
information without indicia of entwinement by the SEC or another 
governmental agency is not sufficient to establish a state action.92  The 
Solomon and D.L. Cromwell93 cases illustrate this position.  In Solomon, the 
NYSE took testimony from a trader under threat of suspension or 
expulsion, and then forwarded the deposition transcript to the SEC pursuant 
to a subpoena.94  In Cromwell, the NASD and federal prosecutors 
simultaneously investigated plaintiff stockbrokers, who in turn sought to 
enjoin the NASD from compelling on-the-record interviews.  Citing the 
Fifth Amendment privilege, the plaintiffs claimed that the NASD inquiry 
was merely a tool for prosecutors, pointing out that the NASD interview 
demands followed shortly after plaintiffs contested grand jury subpoenas.95 
In both cases, the courts held that there was no “state action,” because 
the SROs had independent regulatory interests and motives for conducting 
their respective inquiries.  In Cromwell, the NASD had a preexisting 
“regulatory duty to investigate questionable securities transactions.”96  In 
Solomon, the court found that the NYSE activities were “in pursuance of its 
own interests and obligations, not as [an] agent of the [government].”97  In 
other words, in both cases the SRO would have been conducting 
investigations anyway, regardless of the governmental interest. 
Nevertheless, the SEC has recently acknowledged that under some 
circumstances an SRO may be acting as an agent for the government in 
conducting the investigation.  For example, in Frank P. Quattrone,98 a 
person asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege in response to a request for 
testimony by the NASD under Rule 8210 because of a related pending 
criminal indictment against him.  Quattrone sought to present evidence that 
 
 91.  Application of Justin F. Ficken, Exchange Act Release No. 54699, 2006 WL 
3147424, at *3–5 (Nov. 3, 2006). 
 92.  See Frank P. Quattrone, Exchange Act Release No. 53547, 2006 SEC LEXIS 703, 
at *22 (Mar. 24, 2006) (noting that applicable law requires a “requisite degree of 
coordination,” but that collaboration alone generally cannot constitute state action). 
 93.  D.L. Cromwell Invs., Inc. v. NASD Regulation, Inc., 279 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 94.  Solomon, 509 F.2d at 864–65. 
 95.  Cromwell, 279 F.3d at 156–57. 
 96.  Id. at 163. 
 97.  See Solomon, 509 F.2d at 869 (basing its holding on the additional fact that a 
contrary holding would create a power in the SRO to grant “use immunity” without the 
supervision of the Attorney General to which governmental agencies are subjected). 
 98.  Frank P. Quattrone, Exchange Act Release No. 53547, 2006 SEC LEXIS 703 (Mar. 
24, 2006). 
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the NASD request related to a joint investigation by the SEC, FINRA, and 
the NYSE into research analysts’ conflicts of interest, and that those 
entities decided that the NASD would lead the investigation.99  The hearing 
panel precluded Quattrone from presenting such evidence.100  The SEC 
reversed and remanded the administrative decision, holding that Quattrone 
had the right to present evidence that the NASD’s role in the joint 
investigation rendered it a “state actor.”101 
It should be noted that, although courts and the SEC have generally 
treated FINRA as a private non-governmental body in cases addressing the 
Fifth Amendment privilege, cases involving the immunity of FINRA from 
lawsuits generally uphold that immunity based on the view that FINRA 
“should be entitled to the same immunity enjoyed by the SEC when it is 
performing functions delegated to it under the SEC’s broad oversight 
authority.”102  While these stances appear to be irreconcilable, they do 
represent a level of deference given to SROs in performing their regulatory 
responsibilities.  From a purely practical perspective, sovereign immunity 
is as necessary for an SRO to satisfy its regulatory responsibilities as is the 
ability to compel cooperation in investigations.  The fact that the legal 
support for these important “necessities” has generated diametrically 
opposed decisions appears to be beside the point. 
While FINRA’s capacity to compel its members to cooperate with 
investigations without triggering the “state actor” doctrine is undoubtedly 
important, FINRA’s interpretation of its limitations under the “state actor” 
doctrine is problematic.  Under current FINRA policy, FINRA will not 
conduct “joint” examinations or investigations with state securities 
regulators, nor will it provide state securities regulators access to open 
FINRA investigations.  Because FINRA and the states have overlapping 
jurisdiction and responsibilities, the sharing of information is vital to 
regulatory cost, conservation, and effectiveness.103 
 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  D’Alessio v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 258 F.3d 93, 105 (2d Cir. 2001); see also 
Scher v. Nat'l Assoc. of Sec. Dealers, Inc. (NASD),, 218 Fed. App’x 46 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(holding that NASD actions were actions within the scope of regulatory authority and were 
correspondingly entitled to immunity); Barbara v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 99 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 
1996) (concluding that NASD had absolute immunity from liability arising out of 
administration of its disciplinary function).  
 103.  State securities laws uniformly provide for the sharing of investigative material 
with other regulators, governmental agencies, and SROs.  See UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 
608 (amended 2002) (requiring cooperation, coordination, consultation, and record sharing 
among agencies); UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 415 (amended 1956). 
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2.   Lack of Transparency and Accountability 
One of the pillars of a democratic society is public access to the 
workings of government.  Federal and state legislative sessions and 
hearings are generally open to the public.  Moreover, members of the 
public can walk into any court in the country and watch the proceedings.  
The federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the state counterparts 
allow for public inspection of governmental documents.104 
SROs, however, are not the government.  Their decisions are not made 
in public meetings, nor are their documents subject to FOIA or other 
similar public records requirements.  Even where there is public disclosure 
by an SRO regarding its members, such as information available on 
BrokerCheck, the SRO has placed limitations on such disclosure105  In the 
end, members of the public receive less information than they would if a 
government agency were involved, and may not be able to obtain the 
information they need to make informed decisions.  Likewise, SROs lack 
the accountability to the public that governmental agencies have.  
Ironically, administrative agencies have been criticized in the past for 
lacking accountability.  Congress has the power to enact laws and is 
directly answerable to the public through the ballot box; yet, administrative 
agencies, which have the authority to promulgate rules and regulations that 
have the force and effect of law, are not.  Courts generally have found that 
administrative law is implied by Article I of the U.S. Constitution, so long 
as agencies are created by Congress and act consistent with enabling 
legislation it passes.106 
In this light, SROs are further removed than governmental agencies.  
FINRA, for example, is accountable to the SEC, which has oversight 
authority over it, and to its own members.  FINRA need not, however, be 
responsive to the investing public.  This lack of accountability prompted 
the Boston Consulting Group to call for the enhancement of SEC oversight 
of FINRA.107 
 
 104.  Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006) (original version at 80 Stat. 
378, 383 (1966)); Right-to-Know Law, 65 PA. CONST. STAT. §§ 65.101–67.3104 (2012).  
 105.  BrokerCheck is an online tool that provides information concerning current and 
former FINRA-registered brokerage firms and brokers, and is found at 
http://www.finra.org/investors/toolscalculators/brokercheck/. 
 106.  See generally Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-04, 551–59, (2006) 
(explaining generally the validity of administrative law created by valid Congressional 
agencies). 
 107.  BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, supra note 82, at 135. 
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3.   Inconsistent Enforcement Authority 
The recent case of John J. Fiero and Fiero Brothers, Inc. v. FINRA 
highlights the fact that the enforcement authority granted to SROs by 
Congress under the 1934 Act does not necessarily mirror the enforcement 
authority granted to the SEC itself.108  In Fiero Brothers, the Second Circuit 
held that FINRA lacks the authority to bring court actions to collect 
disciplinary fines.  In that case, the Fiero Brothers were expelled from 
FINRA and fined $1,000,000 plus costs.  After the Fieros refused to pay 
the fine, FINRA brought an action in federal court to enforce the judgment.  
The court of appeals found that even though Congress granted the SRO the 
authority in section 15A(b) of the 1934 Act to fine its members for 
violations, it did not provide any express statutory authority for an SRO to 
bring judicial actions to enforce the collection of those fines.109  In contrast, 
Congress granted in section 21(d) of the 1934 Act the express statutory 
authority for the SEC to seek judicial enforcement of penalties.110  This 
clear absence of enforcement power dilutes FINRA’s deterrent threat. 
4.   Conflicts of Interest 
Like any SRO, FINRA, by its very nature, is plagued by at least the 
appearance of inherent conflicts of interest.  Any conflict of interest, 
however attenuated, invariably raises the question:  whose side is the SRO 
on? 
a. Funding and Executive Compensation 
Any review of how SROs are funded in contrast to the government 
agency that oversees them inevitably will spotlight flaws in this regulatory 
framework.  For example, the SEC is funded primarily from the transfer 
and registration fees from stock trades.111  Those fees, which in 2010 
generated approximately $1,443,000,000, are deposited with the Treasury 
in the first instance.112  The SEC must then petition Congress with its 
proposed budget for an appropriation, currently at the $1,120,000,000 
level, which is significantly less than the SEC requested and the amount of 
 
 108.  550 F.3d 569 (2d Cir. 2011).   
 109.  15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(7) (2006).   
 110.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (2006) (granting authority to courts to issue injunctions and 
money penalties in civil actions).   
 111.  Should the SEC be Self-Funded? Kathleen McBride, ADVISORONE,  
Aug. 10, 2009, http://disqus.com/forums/advisorone/should_the_sec_be_self_funded_59/ 
trackback/.   
 112.  Id. 
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fees it generated.113  Likewise, employees of the SEC are paid in line with 
federal government pay scales.114  The SEC Chairwoman is paid $158,500 
per year. 115 
In contrast, FINRA is largely funded by the businesses it supervises.116  
FINRA’s operating revenue for the 2010 fiscal year was $807,900,000.117  
The vast majority of that operating revenue ($796,500,000 out of 
$807,900,000) was earned through fees charged to FINRA members and 
member firms.118  From the amount of operating revenue, $540,300,000, or 
66.9%, was spent on compensation and benefits.119  Eight out of FINRA’s 
top ten executives earned in excess of $1,000,000 in 2010 in their posts.120 
FINRA’s compensation packages are modeled after executive 
compensation plans at financial services and capital markets firms.121  The 
NASD Chairman’s earnings rose from $2,100,000 in 2001 to $3,140,826 in 
2007.122  In 2010, the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of FINRA 
made a base salary of $1,000,000 and earned a total of $2,609,354.123 
That FINRA’s budget is substantially sourced from the brokers it 
regulates, combined with the fact that FINRA executives are paid large 
salaries, does raise concern.124  If executives are paid relatively opulent 
salaries by the brokers whom they police, the motivation to regulate can 
easily be dampened.  In today’s post-Sarbanes-Oxley world, where public 
 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  2011 Salary Tables and Related Information, U.S. OFFICE OF  
PERS. MGMT., http://www.opm.gov/oca/11tables/index.asp (last visited June 2, 2012).   
 115.  Before the Financial Services Authority was set to be disbanded, it was criticized in 
the British press for how it compensated its own staff.  In 2008, the Telegraph reported that 
“[the FSA] employs 2,740 staff, who last year were paid on average £77,000 in salaries, 
training and pensions.  The six directors were paid an average of £490,000.”  These figures 
were then compared by the former FSA Chairman, Lord Turner, as “far lower than his 
fellow regulators received in America.”  Harry Wallap & David Litterick, FSA Chief Lord 
Turner Under Fire as He Calls for Regulator to Be Given More Money, THE TELEGRAPH, 
Oct. 17, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/3217798/FSA-chief-Lord-
Turner-under-fire-as-he-calls-for-regulator-to-be-given-more-money.html.   
 116.  2010 FINRA YEAR IN REV. & ANN. FIN. REP. 8, http://www.finra.org/web/groups 
/corporate/@corp/@about/@ar/documents/corporate/p123836.pdf. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. at 18. 
 121.  Id.  
 122.  Rosie Levan, SEC’s New Chairman: Who is Mary Schapiro?, THE SUNDAY TIMES, 
Dec. 18, 2008, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_ 
sectors/banking_and_finance/article5364844.ece.  
 123.  2010 FINRA YEAR IN REV. & ANN. FIN. REP. 18. 
 124.  The FSA was funded by the banks and financial institutions themselves, who are 
levied an annual fee.  In 2007, its budget was reported to have totaled £303 million.  See 
Wallap & Litterick, supra note 115. 
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companies are being held to higher standards of independence at the board 
of director level, the compensation structure at FINRA at least has the 
appearance of potential impropriety.  Does a pattern of plentiful executive 
compensation incentivize effective regulation when FINRA’s budget is 
paid by the industry it is intended to regulate? 
Lynn Turner, former chief accountant for the SEC, believes that the 
FINRA compensation practices cannot promote investor protection.125  
According to Turner, “[t]he economic incentives are so strong and these 
executives don’t want to make waves and upset the industry.”126  Richard 
Ketchum, FINRA Chairman and CEO, counters this argument by stating 
that high executive compensation helps to prevent turnover and encourages 
people to “make a career out of regulation.”127 
Finally, it should be noted that FINRA makes investments in the 
securities markets, which also gives rise to potential conflicts of interest.  
For example, in its 2008 annual report, FINRA described the collapse of 
the auction rate securities (ARS) market.128  However, it failed to mention 
that it liquidated its own $647,000,000 ARS investment in 2007, without 
giving warning to investors.129  Regardless whether such warnings were 
warranted at the time, the mere fact that FINRA had substantial amounts 
invested in securities which have since been the subject of fraud 
investigations points to a potential conflict of interest that would not have 
been triggered if a government regulator were involved. 
b. Selection Process for FINRA Executives 
FINRA often solicits executives from financial services and capital 
markets companies it regulates.  FINRA states that such industry players 
are “the most likely group for recruiting talent as well as those that recruit 
talent away from [FINRA].”130  Some would argue that this close 
relationship blurs the line between FINRA and the industry, weakening the 
drive for aggressive regulation.  The Project on Government Oversight, for 
 
 125.  Alexis Leondis & Zeke Faux, Investors May Lose as Congress Saves Money on 
Adviser Oversight, BLOOMBERG NEWS, June 28 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news 
/2011-06-28/investors-may-lose-as-congress-saves-money-on-adviser-oversight.html.   
 126.  Id.   
 127.  Id.   
 128.  2008 FINRA YEAR IN REV. & ANN. FIN. REP. 2, http://www.finra.org/web/groups/ 
corporate/@corp/@about/@ar/documents/corporate/p119061.pdf. 
 129.  Letter from Larry Doyle, Author, Sense on Cents Blog, to the Board of FINRA 
(Jul. 27 2009), available at http://www.senseoncents.com/2009/07/an-open-letter-to-the-
board-of-finra-regarding-auction-rate-securities/.  
 130.  FIN. SERVS. REGULATORY AUTH., FINRA 2010 YEAR IN REVIEW AND ANNUAL 
FINANCIAL REPORT 17 (2010).  
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example, describes the relationship as “incestuous.”131 
Just how close is the relationship between FINRA and the industry?  
A recent court filing describes a web of conflicts.  In a complaint filed in 
August 2009, Amerivet Securities, Inc., a FINRA member-firm, accused 
FINRA of egregious conflicts of interest.  Specifically, the complaint 
alleges: 
Bernard Madoff joined NASD’s Board of Governors in January 
1984 and served as Vice Chairman while his Ponzi scheme was 
well underway;132 
He had previously held a number of NASD committee 
assignments since the 1970s and was instrumental in the 
development of the NASDAQ;133 
He also headed NASDAQ;134 His brother, Peter Madoff, served 
as Vice Chairman of NASD;135 
Mark Madoff, one of Bernard Madoff’s sons, was appointed to 
the National Adjudicatory Council, a regulatory body that 
reviews disciplinary decisions made by FINRA;136 and 
Bernard Madoff’s niece, Shana Madoff, a “Compliance Officer” 
of Madoff until the firm’s collapse, was a member of a 
compliance advisory committee of FINRA.137 
The Board of Governors is FINRA’s “governing body,” and consists 
of 16 to 25 members.138  Governors are nominated by a Nominating 
Committee, comprised of a portion of the Board.  Governors are then 
selected by FINRA’s membership at an annual meeting.  In turn, FINRA’s 
officers are elected by its Board of Governors.139 
FINRA’s bylaws state that “the number of Public Governors shall 
exceed the number of Industry Governors.”140  The bylaws define a “public 
governor” as an individual having “no material business relationship with a 
broker or dealer or a self[-]regulatory organization registered under the Act 
(other than serving as a public director of such a self[-]regulatory 
 
 131.  Brian, supra note 81.  
 132.  Complaint at ¶ 27 n.4, Amerivet Secs., Inc. v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., No. 
2009 CA 005767 B (D.C. Sup. Ct. Aug. 10, 2009).   
 133.  Id.  
 134.  Id.  
 135.  Id.  
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  FINRA BYLAWS, ARTICLE VII, § 1(A), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/ 
display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4629.   
 139.  FINRA BYLAWS, ART. VIII, § 1, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/ 
display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4645.  
 140.  FINRA BYLAWS, Art. VII, § 4(1), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/ 
display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4632. 
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organization).”141 
The process for selecting FINRA’s executive leadership is largely 
controlled by industry players.  FINRA’s membership consists of brokers 
and brokerage firms.142  These members elect the Board.  The Board then 
selects the executive officers.  FINRA has attempted to prevent conflicts of 
interest by stating that the Board must consist of a majority of public 
governors.143 
Notwithstanding these attempted safeguards, FINRA’s leadership 
maintains a close relationship with the financial services industry.  For 
example, before joining FINRA, its CEO was a senior manager at 
Citigroup Inc., serving as general counsel and sitting on several 
committees.144  On one hand, industry professionals may have firsthand 
perspectives on how to improve regulation.  However, industry insiders 
may also instinctively proceed with a light touch when regulating their 
former peers. 
c.  FINRA Arbitration Process and Awards 
Almost every brokerage firm includes in its customer agreements a 
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration provision.  If a case is not settled, the 
only alternative is arbitration, and the only arbitration forum available to 
investors is the one administered by FINRA.  Although arbitration has been 
presented to the public as an inexpensive method of obtaining a speedy and 
fair resolution of the controversy, statistics do not support such claims. 
A review of FINRA arbitration and mediation statistics tells us that 
only a fraction of the damages suffered are awarded to claimants.145  In 
2010, the median amount sought in compensatory damages through FINRA 
arbitration was $310,000.146  The median amount awarded was $129,800.147  
Only forty-seven percent of claimants were awarded any amount of 
damages at all in an arbitration hearing.148  Additionally, claimants must 
 
 141.  FIN. SERVS. REGULATORY AUTH., ARTICLE I DEFINITIONS http://finra.complinet. 
com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4599 (last visited Apr. 7, 2012).  
 142.  About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, FINRA.ORG http://www.finra. 
org/AboutFINRA/ (last visited June 2, 2012).  
 143.  FIN. SERVS. REGULATORY AUTH.,, ARTICLE VII BOARD OF GOVERNORS, 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4599.  
 144.  Richard G. Ketchum, FINRA.ORG, 
http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/Leadership/p019335 (last visited 
June 2, 2012).  
 145.  Leondis & Faux, supra note 126. 
 146.  Id.  
 147.  Id. 
 148. Dispute Resolution Statistics, FINRA.ORG, http://www.finra.org/arbitrationand 
mediation/FINRADisputeResolution/AdditionalResources/Statistics/ (last visited June 2, 
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pay significant filing fees in order to initiate the FINRA arbitration 
process.149  In 2011, arbitration claims involving a hearing took an average 
of fourteen months to conclude, hardly indicative of a “speedy” resolution 
of cases.150 
The investing public may well ask, if the system were truly fair, why 
is arbitration universally demanded by brokerage firms?  It is not surprising 
that the investing public does not have confidence in the arbitration system 
for a fair resolution of claims.151  One reason for the low “success” rate for 
investors in arbitration is the FINRA rule that, until recently, an “industry” 
arbitrator was mandated on a panel of three in claims where the amount in 
controversy exceeded $100,000.152 
The FINRA dispute resolution process is subject to SEC oversight, 
including periodic examinations, approval of rule and substantive 
procedural changes, and review of investor complaints.153  However, 
FINRA readily admits that “[a]ll awards [. . .] are final and are not subject 
to review or appeal, except under limited circumstances.”154  Also, it is 
sometimes difficult for certain regional offices to retain highly qualified 
arbitrators though FINRA Dispute Resolution (DR) “constantly reviews the 
quality of the arbitration roster through . . . reviews conducted by the 
regional offices.”155 
 
2012). 
 149.  Glenn Curtis, When a Dispute with your Broker Calls for Arbitration, 
INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 14, 2007), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/07/arbitration.asp# 
axzz1SyTOs2Wa.   
 150.  Arbitration & Mediation, FINRA.ORG (last visited June 2,  
2012), available at  http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/. 
 151.  For example, a recent study commissioned by the Securities Industry Conference 
on Arbitration found that sixty-two percent of customers in arbitration felt the process was 
unfair.  Jill I. Gross, Perceptions of Fairness of Securities Arbitration: An Empirical Study, 
Feb. 6, 2008, available at http://www.publicjustice.net/Repository/Files/Perceptions 
%20of%20Fairness.pdf.  
 152.  To FINRA’s credit, a recent rule allows claimants in arbitration the choice to have 
three “public” arbitrators in such cases.  See FINRA R. 12403(a), (b), and (d) (FINRA 
2010), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403& 
element_id=4141 (providing customers in cases with three arbitrators to choose between 
two selection methods).   
 153.  SECS. AND EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE PANEL ON SECURITIES 
ARBITRATION—MAY 17, 2010 FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY AUTHORITY STATEMENT 
ON KEY ISSUES (2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/invadvcomm/iacmeeting 
051710-finra.pdf.  
 154.  Arbitration & Mediation, FINRA.ORG, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/ 
(last visited June 2, 2012).  
 155.  Arbitration & Mediation, FINRA.ORG, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/ 
FINRADisputeResolution/AdditionalResources/FAQ/P123925. (last visited June 2, 2012) 
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d. Duplicative Roles for Multiple Regulators 
For as many gaps that exist in the current regulatory system, under a 
certain light, the system can also be considered duplicative in certain areas.  
State regulators, the SEC, and FINRA often undertake similar tasks, 
investigate the same information, and compete for the same resources. 
For example, NASAA describes the role of state securities regulators 
as: 
LICENSING stockbrokers, investment adviser firms (those 
managing less than $25 million in assets),156 and securities firms 
that conduct business in the state.157 
REGISTERING certain securities offered to the states’ investors.158 
INVESTIGATING investor complaints and potential cases of 
investment fraud.159 
ENFORCING state securities laws by fining, penalizing, providing 
restitution to investors, prosecuting white-collar criminals, and 
imposing legally binding conduct remedies designed to correct 
specific problems.160 
EXAMINING brokerage and investment adviser firms to ensure 
compliance with securities laws and maintenance of accurate 
records of client accounts.161 
REVIEWING certain offerings that are not exempt from state 
law.162 
EDUCATING investors about their rights and providing the tools 
and knowledge they need to make informed financial 
decisions.163 
ADVOCATING passage of strong, sensible, and consistent state 
securities laws and regulations.164 
Similarly, FINRA’s website proclaims that it “touches virtually every 
aspect of the securities business.”165  This includes registering and 
educating industry participants, examining securities firms, writing rules, 
 
 156.  This figure has been increased to one hundred million dollars in assets by  
section 410 of the Dodd-Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(a) (2012). 
 157.  The Role of State Securities Regulators, NASAA.ORG, http://www.nasaa.org/about-
us/our-role/. 
 158.  Id.  
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id.  
 161.  Id.  
 162.  Id.  
 163.  Our Role, NASAA.ORG, http://www.nasaa.org/about-us/our-role/ (last visited June 
2, 2012). 
 164.  Id.  
 165.  About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, FINRA.ORG http://www.finra 
.org/AboutFINRA/P125239 (last visited June 2, 2012).  
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enforcing rules, enforcing federal securities laws, educating investors, and 
administering a dispute resolution forum.166  These functions are nearly 
identical to the functions performed, at the state level, by state regulators. 
The SEC is charged with interpreting federal securities laws, issuing 
and amending rules, overseeing regulatory organizations, and coordinating 
U.S. securities regulation with federal, state, and foreign authorities.167  The 
SEC also provides investor education materials.168  Again, these roles are 
virtually identical to the functions performed by FINRA and state 
regulators. 
In a post National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 
(“NSMIA”) universe, state securities regulators have pursued the 
perpetrators at the local level who are scheming against “mom and pop” 
investors.169  In turn, the SEC was expected to focus on the larger, more 
complex fraudulent activities undermining the securities market at a 
national level.170  Nevertheless, states have “exposed and addressed the 
conflicts of interest among Wall Street stock analysts by requiring changed 
behavior.”171  From 2004 until 2009, state securities regulators conducted 
nearly 14,000 enforcement actions which led to $8.4 billion ordered 
returned to investors.172  Additionally, during this period state regulators 
worked to secure convictions for securities laws violators resulting in more 
than 6,000 years in prison.173 
IV. THE CURRENT DEBATE:  AN SRO FOR INVESTMENT 
ADVISERS? 
Over 11,000 investment advisers are currently registered with the 
SEC.  As of September 30, 2010, these advisers managed more than thirty-
eight trillion dollars for more than fourteen million clients.  To date, the 
SEC regulates those investment advisers with assets under management 
(AUM) of twenty-five million dollars and over, while the state securities 
 
 166.  About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, FINRA.ORG, http://www.finra. 
org/AboutFINRA/ (last visited June 2, 2012). 
 167.  The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market 
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC.GOV, http://www.sec.gov/about 
/whatwedo.shtml (last visited June 2, 2012).  
 168.  Office of Investor Education and Advocacy, SEC.GOV, http://www.sec.gov/ 
investor.shtml (last visited June 2, 2012).  
 169.  Enhanced Investor Protection After the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. On Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 3 (2011) (statement of David 
Massey, President, North American Securities Administrators Association). 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Id.  
 172.  Id. at 2.  
 173.  Id. 
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regulators regulate Investment Advisers with AUM up to that threshold.174 
This amount was increased to one hundred million dollars under section 
410 of the Dodd-Frank Act, effective in 2012.175 
In 2010, SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro testified to Congress that the 
Commission would be able to examine only about nine percent of 
registered investment advisers during the 2011 fiscal year.  This statistic 
has led some to argue that an SRO should be created for investment 
advisers.176  FINRA has made it clear that it would like to assume this 
mantle.  In the first quarter of 2011, FINRA spent $300,000 to lobby 
Congress on issues including overtaking investment adviser oversight.177 
In September of 2011, the House Subcommittee on Capital Markets 
and Government Sponsored Enterprises vetted draft legislation granting the 
SEC authority to register one or more SRO’s for the regulation of 
investment advisers.178  It is interesting to note that the investment adviser 
industry is almost universally opposed to an SRO, particularly if that SRO 
is FINRA.179 
SUGGESTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In a perfect world, regulation would be conducted by wholly 
independent regulators.  Regulators would be accountable to the investing 
public; likewise, their actions and decisions would be transparent to the 
public.  Regulators would not be paid, nor would their leaders be elected by 
those they regulate.  Those they regulate—be they brokerage firms, 
brokers, investment advisers or their representatives—would enjoy the 
same constitutional protections afforded to anyone subject to government 
investigation or prosecution. 
Obviously, we do not live in a perfect world.  For valid reasons, 
 
 174.  Investment Advisers: What You Need to Know Before Choosing One, SEC.GOV, 
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/invadvisers.htm (last visited June 2, 2012); The Role of 
State Securities Regulators, NASAA.ORG, http://www.nasaa.org/about-us/our-role/ (last 
visited June 2, 2012). 
 175.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 410, 15 U.S.C. § 
80b-3a(a) (2012).   
 176.  Stephen Luparello, FINRA Vice Chairman, Remarks at FSI Advocacy Summit 
(Oct. 5, 2011), available at http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/Speeches/Luparello/P124599. 
 177.  Leondis & Faux, supra note 125. 
 178.  Kristen French & Diana Britton, House Proposes Bill That Would Give SROs 
Oversight of Investment Advisers, REGISTERED REP, Sept. 8 2011, 
http://registeredrep.com/advisorland/regulatory/house_bill_sro_investment_advisers_0908/. 
 179.  Hearing on Regulation and Oversight of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers 
Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (statement of David G. 
Tittsworth, Executive Director, Investment Adviser Association), available at 
http://financialservices.house.gov/UploadedFiles/091311tittsworth.pdf.  
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Congress enacted SRO legislation for securities regulation in 1938.  Just as 
administrative agencies relieve Congress of overseeing complex matters 
beyond its expertise, SROs can relieve the SEC of the minutia of 
overseeing the membership of financial service providers in an increasingly 
complex financial world.  In addition, as has been acutely demonstrated in 
recent years, it is expensive for the government to fund an agency the size 
of the SEC, and in the age of budget cuts and downsizing government, off-
loading regulation to an SRO, which can be funded directly by its 
members, is an enticing alternative. 
This debate is currently being played out in the halls of Congress, 
where the question is whether there should be SROs to regulate investment 
advisers and their representatives.  Largely lost in this debate, however, is 
the issue of investor protection and relatedly, investor confidence.  While 
opposed to the expansion of any SRO to the regulation of investment 
advisers, should such an expansion occur, we offer the following 
suggestions that would help to protect investors and restore their 
confidence in the financial markets.  These suggestions are applicable to 
FINRA, in its current role as SRO for brokerage firms, and to any future 
SRO structure for investment advisers. 
The “state actor” issue is problematic because it slows down the 
regulatory process by inhibiting sharing among regulators and the SRO. 
Also problematic is the fact that FINRA members are not afforded due 
process protections.  FINRA and other SROs should give thought to 
abandoning the idea that they are not “governmental actors.”  If they have 
been delegated regulatory authority by the government and have 
rulemaking authority, they are in fact acting as the government, and due 
process (as well as the Freedom of Information Act) should apply.  Should 
FINRA and other SROs choose to continue the role of a “private 
membership association,” the current case law on the “state actor” issue 
does not warrant cessation of sharing between the SRO and a regulator, 
absent coercion or a joint investigation.  Any SRO’s sharing policy should 
be consistent with the current state of the law. 
The funding of any SRO, and particularly the funding of its executive 
officers, correlates with the level of public confidence in the SRO.  One 
possible way to combat the appearance of potential impropriety would be 
to change how FINRA is funded.  Currently, FINRA charges fees to its 
members to garner the majority of its operating revenue.  Instead, a portion 
of the federal securities regulation budget could be allocated to these 
activities.  In that case, FINRA regulators would further shield against 
perceptions of undue influence.  This insulation potentially would foster 
more aggressive regulation, which would help FINRA pursue its goal of 
effective investor protection.  Alternatively, the inherent conflict of interest 
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could be better managed if FINRA relinquished disciplinary control over 
its membership and turned enforcement matters back to the states, criminal 
authorities, and the SEC. 
Likewise, the manner in which FINRA’s leadership is elected can 
easily lead to the conclusion of “industry capture.”  To counter this 
inference, several approaches might be considered.  First, FINRA could 
require a “sit-down period” for any industry professional hoping to join 
FINRA’s regulatory leadership.  The professional in question would be 
required to remove himself from the industry for a period of time before 
soliciting a position with FINRA.  Additionally, FINRA could require that 
a certain percentage of its Board of Governors and executive leadership 
consist of consumer advocates and independent directors.  Effective 
regulation should inspire investor confidence.  Consumer advocates should 
have a voice in FINRA’s leadership in order to ensure that investor 
protection is a constant priority.  Again, alternatively, ceding control over 
enforcement matters could also serve to better insulate FINRA from 
outside criticism of its structure. 
FINRA’s arbitration system does not inspire investor confidence.  
First, it is compulsory. The Supreme Court has ruled that the arbitration 
provision is a binding contract;180 however, FINRA could institute 
rulemaking that would prohibit mandatory arbitration provisions.  
Customers would then have a choice between arbitration and litigation.  
Second, the belief that arbitration is not played on a level field is well-
supported.  While we applaud the recent FINRA rule allowing customers to 
choose an all “public” panel, we would urge greater transparency in how 
arbitrators are classified as “public” or “industry” and how they are 
selected for particular cases.181  In the alternative, even if FINRA continues 
to maintain control over all of its other areas (such as enforcement) in its 
effort to be a full service regulator, to make the arbitration process appear 
more independent, FINRA could collaborate with another organization to 
manage the arbitration process.  Removing the dispute resolution process 
from FINRA’s jurisdiction would add to the legitimacy and credibility of 
the arbitration process.  Additionally, FINRA, in collaboration with the 
SEC and state regulators, could create a system for appellate review of 
arbitration decisions. 
FINRA should be answerable to the appropriate governmental 
regulators, not the other way around, as both a legal matter and as a matter 
 
 180.  Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987). 
 181.  See FINRA R. 12403(a), (b), and (d) (FINRA 2010), available at 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4141 
(providing customers in cases with three arbitrators to choose between two selection 
methods).  
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of fact.  The recent Fiero case highlights the need for greater oversight of 
FINRA’s rulemaking.182  Certainly, one cannot lay blame on FINRA if the 
SEC does not exercise its oversight authority.  At the same time, the SEC 
cannot be faulted if it is not afforded the resources to effect such oversight. 
Self-regulation of the retail securities markets in the United States, in 
conjunction with government led regulation, has brought about many 
positive results for investors.  FINRA operates the largest investor 
education foundation in the United States.183  Since its inception in 2003, 
the foundation has approved approximately fifty million dollars in investor 
education and protection initiatives through a combination of grants and 
targeted projects.184  FINRA hosts conferences, training events, compliance 
boot camps, online learning programs, and the FINRA Institute at the 
Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania.185 
Likewise, as the BCG Study found, SROs may offer a “greater 
technical expertise because of their proximity to the industry,” and that 
once a regulatory framework is in place, “self-regulators could monitor the 
industry more efficiently than government regulators.”186 
However, as discussed above, it is time for continued re-evaluation of 
our system at the core.187  Although it appears in the short term that FINRA 
will continue to garner power and influence in the American retail 
securities markets, Congress and American leadership at the federal and 
state levels must consider the longer-term implication of allowing SROs to 
aggrandize authority and power.  It is the retail consumer in the United 
States, the middle class investor, and the vast number of ordinary Main 
Street Americans that, in substantial part, demand power in the global 
economy.  If this dynamic is to continue, as well as a paradigm of self-
regulation, adding credibility to the self-regulatory system is imperative.  
As Michael Smallberg, an investigator with the Project on Government 
Oversight, recently put it:  “[g]iving more authority to FINRA should come 
with additional transparency and accountability” because a “façade of a 
really robust examination or investigation process” will provide a “false 
 
 182.  660 F.3d 569 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 183.  About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ 
AboutFINRA (last visited June 2, 2012). 
 184.  Id.  
 185.  Education, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Industry/Education (last visited Apr. 7, 
2012).  
 186.  BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, supra note 82, at 82. 
 187.  The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank 
Act”), while robustly comprehensive, addresses gaps in regulation of products and gaps in 
areas of securities regulation.  Our view of the Dodd-Frank Act is that the all-consuming 
economic pressures of the recession beginning in 2008 caused Congress and the regulatory 
community to focus on those gaps rather than to include a re-examination of the overall 
existing structure of the American securities regulatory system.   
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sense of confidence for investors.”188 
Notwithstanding, the American near-term reliance on expanding a 
self-regulation system stands in sharp contrast to what our respected 
counterparts in Europe are doing with their financial regulatory systems.  
Europe has eschewed self-regulation in favor of more government-
controlled regulation across the continent.  The European community is not 
giving more responsibility and control to the industry that created the 
recession of 2008; rather, it is eliminating financial self-regulators (as in 
Britain, for instance), and moving to a more government-centric regulatory 
system for the financial markets.189  Congress should be hard pressed to 
continue on the path of self-regulation when its foreign counterparts are 
moving in the opposite direction, given the ostensible interrelatedness of 
our economies, highlighted by the effects on the domestic capital markets 
of the debt crisis in Europe. 
The multi-dimensional American system of regulation is truly one-of-
a-kind.  As the normative solutions presented in this Article suggest, our 
retail securities regulatory structure could stand to significantly improve 
efficiency, decrease compliance costs, and elevate cooperation among 
regulators in both national and international senses.  An open mind to such 
improvements, and leadership in seeing them to speedy fruition, would 
enhance both investor safety and investor confidence. 
 
 
 188.  Finra Oversight Could Cost Investors, supra note 83.   
 189.  In terms of creating a global system for financial regulation to improve world-wide 
securities markets and to support capital building enterprises, the United States Chamber 
Commission on the Regulation of U.S. Capital Markets in the 21st Century, in its Summer 
2011 report entitled, “U.S. Capital Markets Competitiveness: The Unfinished Agenda,” is 
concerned about global disharmony in the capital markets space.  The authors state:   
We still have the same old system—only more of it.  We still have an inexplicable structure 
with multiple federal, state, and nongovernmental regulators, which often have overlapping 
jurisdictions and . . . conflicting regulations on similar activities, products, and services. . . . 
[T]here is no clear plan or strategy to address these fundamental problems . . . [and] foreign 
regulators have told us they will not follow our lead.   
MICHAEL J. RYAN, JR., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS 
COMPETITIVENESS: THE UNFINISHED AGENDA 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/1107_UnfinishedAgenda_WEB.pdf.  
While this Article focuses on improving the American regulatory system for investor 
protection, it is interesting to note that the Chamber of Commerce identifies similar issues 
for capital formation and global leadership in the financial capital markets.  
